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205//! Production middleware for the OpenFang API server.
//!
//! Provides:
//! - Request ID generation and propagation
//! - Per-endpoint structured request logging
//! - In-memory rate limiting (per IP)
use axum::body::Body;
use axum::http::{Request, Response, StatusCode};
use axum::middleware::Next;
use std::time::Instant;
use tracing::info;
/// Request ID header name (standard).
pub const REQUEST_ID_HEADER: &str = "x-request-id";
/// Middleware: inject a unique request ID and log the request/response.
pub async fn request_logging(request: Request<Body>, next: Next) -> Response<Body> {
let request_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let method = request.method().clone();
let uri = request.uri().path().to_string();
let start = Instant::now();
let mut response = next.run(request).await;
let elapsed = start.elapsed();
let status = response.status().as_u16();
info!(
request_id = %request_id,
method = %method,
path = %uri,
status = status,
latency_ms = elapsed.as_millis() as u64,
"API request"
);
// Inject the request ID into the response
if let Ok(header_val) = request_id.parse() {
response.headers_mut().insert(REQUEST_ID_HEADER, header_val);
}
response
}
/// Bearer token authentication middleware.
///
/// When `api_key` is non-empty, all requests must include
/// `Authorization: Bearer <api_key>`. If the key is empty, auth is bypassed.
pub async fn auth(
axum::extract::State(api_key): axum::extract::State<String>,
request: Request<Body>,
next: Next,
) -> Response<Body> {
// If no API key configured, restrict to loopback addresses only.
if api_key.is_empty() {
let is_loopback = request
.extensions()
.get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
.map(|ci| ci.0.ip().is_loopback())
.unwrap_or(false);
if !is_loopback {
tracing::warn!(
"Rejected non-localhost request: no API key configured. \
Set api_key in config.toml for remote access."
);
return Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN)
.header("content-type", "application/json")
.body(Body::from(
serde_json::json!({
"error": "No API key configured. Remote access denied. Configure api_key in ~/.openfang/config.toml"
})
.to_string(),
))
.unwrap_or_default();
}
return next.run(request).await;
}
// Public endpoints that don't require auth (dashboard needs these)
let path = request.uri().path();
if path == "/"
|| path == "/api/health"
|| path == "/api/health/detail"
|| path == "/api/status"
|| path == "/api/version"
|| path == "/api/agents"
|| path == "/api/profiles"
|| path == "/api/config"
|| path.starts_with("/api/uploads/")
// Dashboard read endpoints — allow unauthenticated so the SPA can
// render before the user enters their API key.
|| path == "/api/models"
|| path == "/api/models/aliases"
|| path == "/api/providers"
|| path == "/api/budget"
|| path == "/api/budget/agents"
|| path.starts_with("/api/budget/agents/")
|| path == "/api/network/status"
|| path == "/api/a2a/agents"
|| path == "/api/approvals"
|| path.starts_with("/api/approvals/")
|| path == "/api/channels"
|| path == "/api/skills"
|| path == "/api/sessions"
|| path == "/api/integrations"
|| path == "/api/integrations/available"
|| path == "/api/integrations/health"
|| path.starts_with("/api/cron/")
|| path.starts_with("/api/providers/github-copilot/oauth/")
{
return next.run(request).await;
}
// Check Authorization: Bearer <token> header
let bearer_token = request
.headers()
.get("authorization")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer "));
// SECURITY: Use constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
let header_auth = bearer_token.map(|token| {
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
if token.len() != api_key.len() {
return false;
}
token.as_bytes().ct_eq(api_key.as_bytes()).into()
});
// Also check ?token= query parameter (for EventSource/SSE clients that
// cannot set custom headers, same approach as WebSocket auth).
let query_token = request
.uri()
.query()
.and_then(|q| q.split('&').find_map(|pair| pair.strip_prefix("token=")));
// SECURITY: Use constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
let query_auth = query_token.map(|token| {
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
if token.len() != api_key.len() {
return false;
}
token.as_bytes().ct_eq(api_key.as_bytes()).into()
});
// Accept if either auth method matches
if header_auth == Some(true) || query_auth == Some(true) {
return next.run(request).await;
}
// Determine error message: was a credential provided but wrong, or missing entirely?
let credential_provided = header_auth.is_some() || query_auth.is_some();
let error_msg = if credential_provided {
"Invalid API key"
} else {
"Missing Authorization: Bearer <api_key> header"
};
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)
.header("www-authenticate", "Bearer")
.body(Body::from(
serde_json::json!({"error": error_msg}).to_string(),
))
.unwrap_or_default()
}
/// Security headers middleware — applied to ALL API responses.
pub async fn security_headers(request: Request<Body>, next: Next) -> Response<Body> {
let mut response = next.run(request).await;
let headers = response.headers_mut();
headers.insert("x-content-type-options", "nosniff".parse().unwrap());
headers.insert("x-frame-options", "DENY".parse().unwrap());
headers.insert("x-xss-protection", "1; mode=block".parse().unwrap());
// All JS/CSS is bundled inline — only external resource is Google Fonts.
headers.insert(
"content-security-policy",
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob:; connect-src 'self' ws://localhost:* ws://127.0.0.1:* wss://localhost:* wss://127.0.0.1:*; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; media-src 'self' blob:; frame-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'"
.parse()
.unwrap(),
);
headers.insert(
"referrer-policy",
"strict-origin-when-cross-origin".parse().unwrap(),
);
headers.insert(
"cache-control",
"no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate".parse().unwrap(),
);
response
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_request_id_header_constant() {
assert_eq!(REQUEST_ID_HEADER, "x-request-id");
}
}